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InTroducTIon
To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bod-
ies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like 
ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer 
afford indifference to suffering outside our borders; nor 
can we consume the world’s resources without regard to 
effect. For the world has changed, and we must change 
with it.
—President Barack Obama1
More than any U.S. president in history, Barack Obama 
has focused public attention on global hunger and the need to 
bolster food production by small-scale farmers in developing 
countries. He championed this cause at the 2009 G-8 meeting 
in L’Aquila, Italy, where he called on world leaders to commit 
$20 billion to address food security, promising $3.5 billion from 
the United States.2 After a series of consultations among vari-
ous government agencies and civil society organizations, the 
Obama Administration launched the Feed the Future initiative in 
April 2010.3 This program emphasizes the importance of small-
scale farmers, especially women, in country-led programs and 
a multiagency “whole of government” approach to global food 
security.4
Conversely, trade talks are gaining new momentum. After 
a two-year lull following the collapse of the World Trade Orga-
nization (“WTO”) talks in 2008, G-20 leaders have called for 
a resumption of the negotiations in 2011, with WTO Director 
General Pascal Lamy calling for completion of draft modality 
texts by the end of March.5 The United States is also promoting 
its own ambitious agenda of regional and bilateral trade talks. 
Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership continue to advance 
and to expand to even more countries in Southeast Asia.6 The 
U.S. and South Korean governments recently resolved remain-
ing differences over market access for automobiles in the United 
States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”).7 That agreement, 
along with pending bilateral agreements with Panama and 
Colombia, could be introduced for Congressional approval in 
2011.8
The food, finance, and climate crises are all evidence of how 
much the world has changed since the era of free trade accords 
began, but the U.S. agricultural trade agenda remains essentially 
the same as the approach first adopted in the 1990s under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).9 Recent 
reports of rising food prices and riots in some countries10 add 
new urgency to the imperative to get these policies right.
U.S. trade policy must start from our goals rather than our 
tactics. Ending global hunger, enhancing incomes and employ-
ment, and encouraging a transition to climate friendly agriculture 
should be the goals of U.S. agricultural, economic, and develop-
ment policy. Trade policy should be a tool to support those goals 
rather than a loose cannon that shoots them down.
From dumPIng To VoLaTILITy: The Lessons  
oF Trade LIberaLIzaTIon
Much of the international debate on trade and agriculture 
over the past decade has focused on U.S. (and EU) agricultural 
subsidies11 but have not addressed the systemic causes of dump-
ing, i.e., exporting at below the cost of production. Floods of 
cheap imports, especially during the harvest, can be devastat-
ing for developing-country farmers.12 As of 2003, dumping 
margins for U.S. commodity crops supported under the Farm 
Bill included wheat exports at an average price of twenty-eight 
percent below the cost of production, corn at ten percent, and 
rice at twenty-six percent below the cost of production.13 Today, 
recurring bouts of rising food prices have decreased the extent of 
dumping,14 but deregulated trade continues to present challenges 
for stable local food markets.
Over the last few decades, U.S. agricultural policy has 
changed from a system of supply management to one more 
dependent on free-market forces. This process culminated in the 
1996 Farm Bill, which removed the last vestiges of supply man-
agement and enacted policies to encourage farmers to increase 
the volume of production to compensate for lower prices, with 
a strong focus on creating new markets overseas for U.S. com-
modities.15 That system soon resulted in a series of crises in rural 
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areas and the enactment of emergency payments, later codified 
as the current system of agricultural subsidies.16
Commodity prices skyrocketed during 2007 and 2008, 
and farmers were better able to cover their costs of production, 
reducing counter-cyclical payments from the U.S. government 
to farmers, which rise to compensate farmers when prices are 
low for those crops.17 As a result of this increase in commod-
ity prices, U.S. agricultural subsidies dropped from more than 
twenty-four billion dollars in 2005 to just over twelve billion 
dollars in 2009.18 In many countries, locally grown food sud-
denly became cheaper than imports, but after decades of neglect 
of agricultural sectors, production levels were too low to be 
able to fully meet domestic demand.19 Concerns over dump-
ing have been overtaken by alarm over food-price volatility, as 
wild swings in prices make planning more and more difficult for 
farmers around the world.
The precise causes of the 2008 food price crisis and 
the recent bouts of price swings are still the subject of much 
debate.20 They include rising demand, extreme weather condi-
tions, and excessive financial institution speculation on com-
modity markets.21 New limits on commodity speculation in the 
United States and EU are imperative to decrease the wild price 
swings experienced in recent years.22 However, policymakers in 
developing countries also need new ways to manage trade flows, 
so they can rebuild fragile agricultural sectors.
Mexico’s experience under NAFTA provides a telling exam-
ple of the dangers of this approach for food security and rural 
livelihoods. The agreement eliminated trade barriers for most 
sectors, with tariffs on corn and beans phased out over fourteen 
years.23 In fact, the Mexican government accelerated the tariff 
reduction schedule, and United States exports of corn to Mexico 
nearly quadrupled compared to the pre-NAFTA levels.24 Mexi-
can agricultural exports to the United States also increased at an 
average of ten percent a year,25 but the benefits of those sales 
did not trickle down to rural communities. Many Mexican farm-
ers were unable to compete with the cheap imports, and more 
than two million have left the agricultural sector since NAFTA 
began, a drop of nearly twenty-five percent.26 Since job creation 
in other sectors of the economy has been weak, rural poverty has 
increased and many people have been forced to migrate to cities 
in search of elusive manufacturing sector jobs or to the United 
States in search of better opportunities.27
There is little evidence that the growth in U.S. exports under 
NAFTA has helped family farmers in this country either. The 
number of Americans employed in agriculture has dropped since 
the agreement began (as has manufacturing employment).28 
The relationship between employment and trade is complex, 
even in the United States, as job creation from export growth 
can be offset by job losses resulting from imports that compete 
with domestic production. The kind of production also matters 
as large-scale agro-industrial production for export generally 
employs fewer people than smaller-scale, locally oriented pro-
duction. As smaller-scale producers have been forced to seek off-
farm income, larger producers and corporations have increased 
their share of production. Over the last twenty-five years, there 
has been a marked shift in the size of U.S. farms, with very small 
farms (with annual sales less than ten thousand dollars) and very 
large farms (sales exceeding one million dollars) increasing 
by thirty-eight and 243 percent, respectively.29 The number of 
small, but commercially viable farms (sales between ten and two 
hundred and fifty thousand dollars) dropped by forty percent, 
from half of total farms in 1982 to less than a third in 2007.30 
The percentage of U.S. agricultural production controlled by the 
top four firms in a given sector has increased substantially, rising 
from seventy-two percent of beef packing in 1990, for example, 
to 83.5 percent in 2005.31
Since NAFTA, U.S. agricultural production, both for 
domestic use and exports, has increased while rural employment 
and livelihoods have faltered. While a substantial portion of corn 
production is now directed to domestic ethanol production,32 
exports of corn, wheat, and other commodity crops have con-
tinued to grow.33 According to the United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) estimates, agricultural bulk export vol-
umes increased eight percent in 2010 over 2009 levels, while the 
bulk export values increased seventeen percent.34
The recent surge in U.S. farm income is instructive. Net 
farm income increased twenty-six percent in 2010 over the 
2000–2009 average, triggered, according to some analysts, by 
rising exports.35 However, the USDA also notes that,
[a] second feature of the 2000–2009 decade is the high 
and persistent levels of volatility in agricultural com-
modity and input (feed, fuel, and fertilizer) markets. 
The volatility is reflected in the patterns of farm income 
during the decade. Net farm income increased in 6 of 
the 10 years, posting an average increase of 26.6 per-
cent in the years with increases in farm income and 
an average decline of 23.5 percent in the other years 
(2002, 2005, 2006, and 2009).36
These wild swings in prices and incomes destabilize rural 
communities and contribute to increasing corporate concentra-
tion. Whether in the United States or overseas, agricultural poli-
cies that stabilize prices at levels nearer the cost of production 
could provide consistent signals and incentives to help farmers 
stay on their land and produce stable food supplies.37
These problems are not unique to the NAFTA partners. 
In country after country, trade liberalization in agriculture has 
weakened local production and undermined rural livelihoods.38 
Women produce sixty to eighty percent of food in many devel-
oping countries.39 They are particularly vulnerable to the risks 
created by dumping and volatile markets, since their access to 
productive resources is often already precarious. The emphasis 
on agricultural exports in the 1990s tended to result in a shift 
away from food production for household consump tion, which 
tended to be controlled by women, to cash crops, which tended 
to be controlled by men.40 The U.S. Feed the Future initiative 
recognizes the vital importance of women’s contributions to 
food secu rity and would direct more resources to women farm-
ers.41 If the point of the U.S. global hunger policy is to improve 
food security and rural livelihoods for women and men, then 
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appropriate trade mechanisms also need to be in place to ensure 
that they can stay on their land.
Haiti is another stark example of how trade policies can 
undermine food security. As recently as the 1980s, Haiti pro-
duced eighty percent of the rice it needed for domestic consump-
tion.42 Under structural adjustment programs imposed by the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and United 
States Agency for International Development (“USAID”), 
among others, Haiti lifted import controls and reduced public 
support to agriculture.43 Today, it imports eighty percent of its 
rice needs and receives substantial food aid for recurring food 
shortages.44
In March 2010, former President Bill Clinton testified to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the push to export rice 
to Haiti had been a grave mistake, stating:
Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy, 
until the last year or so when we started rethinking it, 
that we rich countries that produce a lot of food should 
sell it to poor countries and relieve them of the bur-
den of producing their own food, so, thank goodness, 
they can leap directly into the industrial era. It has not 
worked. It may have been good for some of my farmers 
in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake. It 
was a mistake that I was a party to. I am not pointing 
the finger at anybody. I did that. I have to live every day 
with the consequences of the lost capacity to produce a 
rice crop in Haiti to feed those people, because of what 
I did. Nobody else.45
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that the U.S. government 
has in fact started to rethink this policy. The President’s 2010 
Trade Policy Agenda clearly stated the intention to expand U.S. 
exports, even to developing countries.46 While Least Developed 
Countries (“LDCs”) are not being asked to agree to any new 
commitments to reduce tariffs under the Doha Round, there is 
no indication that United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) 
is reconsidering the wisdom of the previous rounds of tariff 
reductions.
A better approach would be to explicitly exempt low-income 
food import-dependent countries from U.S. export promotion 
goals and to allow flexibility to establish tariff rates adequate 
to protect their vulnerable agricultural markets. The LDCs, as 
defined by the United Nations, include some forty-eight least-
developed countries, thirty-one of which are also members of 
the WTO.47 It includes such countries as Haiti, Senegal, and 
Bangladesh, many of which experienced food riots during the 
2008 price spike.48 The United States does not have free-trade 
trade agreements with any of these countries, so this would be a 
relatively simple first step.
A second step would be to more carefully consider poverty 
and hunger within middle-income countries. USTR has entered 
into a series of discussions with India, Brazil, South Africa, and 
China, both to enlist their support to restart the WTO talks, and 
to press them to liberalize their own markets.49 Each of these 
countries is unique, but they all face challenges in local food 
production. According to research prepared for the United 
Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) Human Develop-
ment Report, there are more poor people in India than in the 
twenty-six African countries combined,50 and suicides by farm-
ers who have lost their land are devastating evidence of the fra-
gility of their agricultural system.51
Developing countries in the G-33 have argued for WTO 
exemptions for Special Products and for the establishment of a 
new Special Safeguard Mechanism to protect food security and 
livelihoods and to advance rural development.52 While WTO 
members (including the United States) committed to the prin-
ciple of protecting local markets to advance food security at the 
2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, in practice this has been a central 
point of contention in the WTO talks.53 The G-33’s insistence 
on these mechanisms (as well as United States intransigence on 
subsidies) was one of the key factors in the collapse of the WTO 
talks in 2008.54 A better approach would be to work with devel-
oping countries to consider the best ways to implement these 
mechanisms and other necessary measures to advance food 
security goals over export promotion.
The Trade ruLes needed To resPond To 
cLImaTe and Food crIses
Agriculture has always been subject to unpredictable 
weather patterns, pests, and diseases. These risks are exacer-
bated by climate change, which is already causing changes in 
growing seasons and increases in droughts and flooding.55 These 
effects will become more frequent and more devastating in years 
to come,56 making it even more important to support flexible and 
innovative new approaches in developing countries. Efforts to 
strengthen local agricultural production in ways that respond to 
these challenges and benefit local communities and plans to fos-
ter regional cooperation in times of crisis are critical.
National and regional coordination of food reserves is 
emerging as an important tool to confront volatility in food sup-
plies. The UN Comprehensive Framework for Action on the 
Global Food Crisis (a multiagency effort to coordinate donor 
policies) recognizes the importance of reserves.57 Reserves and 
other measures to limit price volatility and supply availability 
will be at the center of the agenda at the May 2011 G-20 Agri-
culture Ministers summit and the fall Committee on World Food 
Security meeting.58
Several groupings of countries are already taking action to 
implement regional reserves systems. “In March 2010, Brazil, 
Russia, India and China (the BRIC nations) agreed to support the 
establishment of a system of national grain reserves.”59 In Octo-
ber, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) plus 
Japan, China, and Korea committed to establish a regional emer-
gency rice reserve, building on a pilot program that has been 
operating for several years.60 In December, West African nations 
meeting in the Club du Sahel explored proposals to coordinate 
national food reserves systems to assist each other in cases of 
crop failures or other crises.61
A system of food reserves does not replace international 
trade, but it can be an important means to stabilize national 
and regional food supplies. Food reserves can be supported or 
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constrained by trade rules that govern public support to agricul-
ture. WTO rules and U.S. trade policy discourage public man-
agement of food supplies, but there is some degree of flexibility 
that would not prevent countries from starting to implement 
such programs.62 Food reserves do require public support to buy 
and sell stocks. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture limits how 
much governments can spend to support agriculture.63 While the 
establishment of a grain reserve in the United States could raise 
overall support beyond those limits, developing countries would 
be unlikely to exceed the limits included under current rules.
Price bands could be a bigger issue for U.S. trade policy. 
Most reserves systems operate so that when prices reach pre-
determined floors or ceilings the government intervenes.64 If it 
has buffer stocks, it could release those reserves onto the market 
to reduce high prices or confront local food shortages. It would 
purchase grains when prices are low, particularly during the har-
vest. These price bands are often coordinated with trade policy, 
with tariffs on imports triggered when prices fall, and reduced 
when they rise. While WTO rules generally limit such measures, 
in practice, many developing countries have some degree of flex-
ibility in the application of tariff rates.65 Since many of them 
have agreed to bound tariff rates (ceilings) that are higher than 
the actual applied rates, they could utilize the difference in tariff 
rates (“water” in WTO lingo) to operate a price band and still 
comply with WTO rules.66 The G-33’s proposals for a Special 
Safeguard Mechanism would institutionalize price bands as a 
legitimate tool to combat volatility.67 USTR has argued against 
these measures at the WTO, pressing for reductions in bound 
tariff rates and opposing the G-33’s proposal for a Special Safe-
guard Mechanism.68 In negotiations for a US-Andean Free Trade 
Agreement, the United States insisted on the dismantling of 
the system of price bands established under the Andean Pact.69 
Those negotiations were later narrowed to a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and Peru, which liberalized all trade 
in agricultural goods and eliminated the Peruvian government’s 
participation in the regional price band.70
The conflicts between trade rules and food reserves could 
emerge in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(“TPP”). The TPP talks currently include Australia, Brunei, 
Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United 
States, and Vietnam.71 The Philippines, Canada, and Japan have 
also expressed interest in joining the talks.72 Brunei, Malaysia, 
Vietnam and the Philippines are also members of ASEAN and 
are participating in the Emergency Rice Reserve System, as is 
South Korea.73 Those talks should balance interests in expand-
ing trade with the measures needed to support food reserves and 
other elements of food security.
InTegraTIng nuTrITIon In Trade and 
deVeLoPmenT
Improving food security means increasing both the quantity 
of food available to local consumers and ensuring that its nutri-
tional quality is adequate. The administration’s Feed the Future 
initiative lists two central objectives: accelerating inclusive agri-
culture sector growth, and improving nutritional status.74 U.S. 
trade policy focuses on harmonizing food safety standards (both 
to generate new market opportunities and to ensure consumer 
safety),75 but it does not consider the nutritional value of the 
kinds of food systems encouraged by liberalization of trade and 
investment.
The debate on nutritional quality is already underway within 
the United States, where concerns about rising obesity rates and 
food safety have increased demand for organic foods and locally 
grown fruits and vegetables.76 There is a growing public rec-
ognition that Farm Bill supports for corn, soy, wheat, and rice 
have shifted diets towards processed foods and meats rather than 
healthier alternatives.77 U.S. trade policy should also reflect this 
new thinking in the kinds of food production encouraged by lib-
eralized trade and the innovations needed to improve nutritional 
outcomes.
Mexico’s experience under NAFTA provides some impor-
tant lessons. Since the agreement’s inception in 1994, Mexi-
can imports of corn and soy used for animal feed, as well as 
of processed snack foods, soda and other foods characteristic 
of unhealthy diets, have skyrocketed.78 Liberalization of trade 
and investment rules has also spurred sharp increases in U.S. 
investment all along the Mexican supply chain, including food 
processing, supermarkets and fast food restaurants.79 Obesity 
rates in Mexico have risen to rates similar to those in the United 
States.80 Among OECD countries, Mexico is now tied with 
the United States for the highest per capita obesity rates in the 
world.81 The phenomenon of increasing malnutri tion occurring 
at the same time as over-nutrition is escalating in many countries 
around the world as people just above the poverty line consume 
increasing amounts of meats, processed foods and other rela-
tively low-cost, high-calorie foods.82
The United States cannot legislate consumer demand in 
other countries, but it could assure that its trade policy does not 
preclude governments from implementing changes in local food 
systems to improve the quality of food available to consumers. A 
government might decide, for example, to procure fresh food for 
anti-poverty programs from local farm cooperatives rather than 
importing it from a multinational corporation (along the lines of 
Brazil’s successful Zero Hunger program).83 Depending on how 
the government has listed the implementing agencies in its trade 
commitments, these kinds of programs could conflict with pro-
curement rules that aim to prevent discrimination against foreign 
suppliers.84
Some types of food security programs could also be the 
target of investor lawsuits. Like nearly all U.S. trade agree-
ments and bilateral investment treaties, NAFTA allows foreign 
investors to sue governments for compensation for regula tory 
changes or programs that undermine their expected profits.85 
One section of the investment chapter bans certain “performance 
requirements” on foreign investors, including the requirement to 
achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content in pro-
duction.86 Thus, for example, if the Mexican government were to 
require tortilla manufacturers in Mexico to use a certain percent-
age of locally grown (and more expensive) corn in their produc-
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tion, U.S. companies that own tortilla operations there could sue 
for compensation.
Most trade agreements include recourse to state-to-state dis-
pute resolution.87 The investor-state provision allows companies 
to bypass that mechanism, as well as local court systems, to sue 
governments directly.88 Most environmental, labor, and other 
public-interest groups have argued against this provision in most 
bilateral trade agreement the United States has negotiated since 
NAFTA.89
These concerns are not just theoretical. The U.S.-based Met-
alclad corporation was awarded $15.6 million in compensation 
when it sued the Mexican government over a local community’s 
refusal to reopen a toxic waste facility.90 A subsidiary of the 
U.S.-based Bechtel corporation sued the Bolivian government 
when it cancelled the privatization of a water distribution system 
in the wake of widespread public protests over excessive user 
fees.91 In 2010, Phillip Morris filed an investor-state suit against 
the Uruguayan government over rules on health warnings on cig-
arette packages.92 Even when such suits are unsuccessful, they 
have a chilling effect on local efforts to balance public interests 
with private profits.
Some trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties 
include tentative first steps that could start to address that imbal-
ance. The United States-Peru FTA, for example, establishes 
some general exceptions for measures designed to protect pub-
lic health, safety and the environment, but these exceptions do 
not apply to the chapter on investment.93 This kind of exception 
should be applied more broadly to specifically exempt public 
interest laws from challenges.94
Unfortunately, current U.S. trade policy seems to be headed 
in the opposite direction, affirming the Bush era approach. News 
reports indicate that the United States is pressing Australia, 
which refused to include the investor-state provision in its FTA 
with the United States, to reconsider that position in the talks 
for a Trans-Pacific Partnership.95 The recently signed US-Korea 
FTA resorts to the old approach as well, with only limited excep-
tions to protect the public good.96
recommendaTIons
Ultimately, the U.S. government should take a compre-
hensive set of acts that will alleviate these problems. It should 
review provisions in existing trade agreements that undermine 
food security and launch a process to reform them.97 The admin-
istration should explicitly exempt Least Developed Countries 
from U.S. export-promotion goals, and work with developing 
countries to establish trade rules that support price bands and 
other mechanisms to promote stable food supplies. On an inter-
governmental level, it should support proposals at the WTO and 
in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership for Special 
Products and Special Safeguard Mechanisms to advance food 
security and rural livelihoods in developing countries. Lastly, the 
United States could establish exceptions to investment and pro-
curement provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and other 
ongoing bilateral trade negotiations to protect public health and 
food security.
concLusIon
Rather than continuing with the same tired approaches 
used in recent decades, it is time for a truly twenty-first century 
approach to trade policy, one that starts with a clear commitment 
to strengthening food systems and rural livelihoods in the South 
and North. It is not enough to consider changes in trade balances 
or growth in exports in particular sectors. We must examine how 
those changes affect our societies and environments, both in the 
North and South.
The 2008 food price crisis led to a reexamination of agri-
cultural development policies and the conclusion that decades of 
neglect of public investment in the sector had been a mistake.98 
President Obama took a leadership role in the 2009 G-8 meeting, 
committing to scale up food security spending and calling on 
other countries to do the same.99 The Feed the Future initiative 
and increases in U.S. government spending on food security are 
evidence of a commitment to redress that mistake and chart a 
new course to decrease global hunger.
Sadly, that effort will likely collide with the administration’s 
push to double U.S. exports and negotiate new trade agree ments 
along the same lines as the past. Spending to increase produc-
tion by smallholder farmers will be undercut by floods of U.S. 
exports. Efforts to establish food reserves could be undercut by 
trade rules that restrict governments’ abilities to manage sup-
plies.100 Programs to encourage consumption of healthy, locally 
grown foods could collide with investor protections that fail to 
balance public and private interests.101 Decades of expansion of 
agricultural exports have not helped U.S. farmers either. Farm 
incomes have been on a rollercoaster ride that has thrown farm-
ers overboard, increasing corporate concentration.102 There is no 
reason to expect that expanding the same failed policies of the 
past will have better outcomes now.
Instead, trade and food security policy should focus on 
rebuilding local food systems in the North and South. This does 
not mean abandoning trade or closing markets, but considering 
ways to ensure that trade complements, rather than substitutes 
for, local food production. The U.S. government should work 
with developing countries to determine the best ways to struc-
ture price bands and other trade protections to achieve food 
security and development goals, rather than blocking progress 
on these new approaches.
Added to the evidence of the past is the challenge of the 
future. Climate change and the end of cheap oil is a dispositive 
factor in determining food security and trade policy.103 Innova-
tive new approaches that build on local knowledge to reduce 
reliance on agro chemicals and imported inputs are not just excit-
ing, they are imperative.104 Trade and development policies must 
create the necessary policy space for these innovations rather 
than insisting on the extension of twentieth century models of 
industrial agriculture and dependence on imports.
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